



THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO DECLARE AN
ACT OF CONGRESS VOID FOR UNCONSTITU-
TIONALITY.
In order that the national Constitution should secure to us a
republican form of government, its framers considered it a
fundamental principle to separate and preserve independent
the legislative, executive and judicial departments.
A division of the powers of government had become a set.
tled principle in the formation of nearly if not all the consti-
tutions of the original thirteen States. Therefore the framers
of the national Constitution established one department to
make laws, and another to execute them; and having deter-
mined the powers of these two, they ordained and established
a judicial department, and invested it with co-ordinate (but
also with circumscribed) powers, to expound the Constitution,
to interpret the statute by comparing it with the fundamen-
tal law, to have the authority to declare what is not law, and
to administer justice under the law.
In the discussion of this subject, the order of history and
the logical connection of principles unite to suggest the fol.
lowing analysis:
I. To show that prior to the Constitution the courts of the
American colonies declared null, laws enacted by Parliament
II. To show that under the confederation judicial questions
ef a national character were determined by a court.
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I. TO explain the object sought by its framers in making
the powers of a constitutional government separate and inde-
pendent, and in creating a judiciary co-ordinate with the
other departments; also, to show that. the judiciary have the
right of an annulling power, by giving a history of the con-
ventions which framed and ratified the Constitution.
IV. To vindicate this right independently of the judiciary
system of England, by drawing comparisons between the Eng-
lish and American governments.
V. To distinguish between legislative and judicial power,
and to show that the latter is circumscribed by self-imposed
restrictions.
Vi. To review the interpretation given by its expounders
of that part of the Constitution which confers the national
jurisdiction.
VII. To show why the judiciary should be empowered with
authority to annul an Act of Congress for unconstitutionality.
I. Prior to the Constitution, the courts of the American colo-
hies declared null laws enacted by Parliament.
In England, the supreme legislative authority and the power
of deciding upon the constitutionality of its acts are vested in
the Parliament. It is said that the maxims upon which its leg-
islature proceeds are not defined and ascertained by any par-
ticular stated law, but that they rested entirely within the
breast of the Parliament itself; and that the dignity and inde-
pendence of thotwo houses are preserved ina great measure by
keeping their privileges indefinite: 1 Wilson's Law Lectures.
But James Otis, a Massachusetts delegate to the first Conti-
nental Congress, which sat in New York in 1765 (see Tudor's
Life of James Otis (1823) p. 62), stated, in the year 1761 (a
quarter of a century before the framing of our Constitution),
that which afterward became the principle of American con-
stitutional law. This declaration occurred before the Su-
perior Court of Judicature for the Province of Massachusetts
Day, upon the grant by that court of general writs of assist-
ance. In argument before it, he repudiated the English doctrine
that Parliament is the final arbiter of the justice and consti.
tutionality of its acts, and contended that the validity of
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statutes must be determined by courts of justice. This he
quoted from Viner's (English) Abridgment. Though this
principle is peculiar to a republican government, and can
never become incorporated into the English aristocratic system,
Otis was sustained by the doctrine of Lord CoKE and others
of England's leading jurists-Lords HOB'!ART and HOLT.,
The history of this country affords more than one example
where courts of justice (before 1787) declared acts of thesupreme
legis2ative authority null and void for unconstilttionality.
llntheyear 1792the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that an act
passed by the Colonial Legislature in 1712, which was againstthe Magna Charta,
was ipso facto void: Bowman v. 26dtdt~on, I Bay 252.
In 1786 the Superior Court of Rhode Island refused to act under a statute
of the General Assembly, which was contrary to the State constitution as
embodied in the Royal Charter, Charles II. For history of Rhode Island Ten-
der Law, reference is made to 4 Hildreth's istory U.S. 34. (New York, Harper
Bros., 1863.) 2'revilt v. Weeden, reported by Varnum, Providence, 17.
The legislature at once summoned the judges to answer for their conduct;
they were impeached, and when their terms expired at the end of the year
the legislature supplanted four of the live judges of the court by other judges
who were more supple to the legislative will: (Speech of Goddard, Antals of
7th Congress 729.)
There is another instance where impeachment was resorted to by a State
legislature upon one of its acts being annulled by the judges. Calvin Pease
and George Tod were arraigned before the Ohio legislature, about the year
1808, but they were both acquitted upon the articles of impeachment: Western
Law ionthly, 1863, vol. 5, p. 3, and August No. same vol.
In 1787 the judges of North Carolina set aside an act in violation of the
State constitution of 1776: Den v. Singleton, Martin N. C. 49. In 1787 the
judges of Virginia refused to execute a law that the judges of the Court of
Appeals should be Circuit Court judges: (Speech of Calhoun, Annals of 7th
Congress 141.) The legislature apparently acquiesced in their decision, newly
modeled the law (see speech of Henderson, who said it was in 1792-Annals of
7th Congress 527), and established a separate Court of Appeals, the judges of
which were to be elected by joint ballot of the two houses, agreeably to the
Constitution. The judges of Appeals were relieved, and six of them were
elected judges of the new Court of Appeals, now created separately-others
being appointed in their places as judges of Court of Chancery, General
Court and Court of Admiralty. This law the judges declared unconstitutional,
not because a court which had been created by law had been abolished (for the
Court of Appeals was expressly established by the Constitution), but because
it was an amotion from office of the whole bench of judges of Appeals, and the
appointment of new Judges to the same court. (Speech of Nicholson, Annals
of 7th Congress 825.,
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In 1768 the highest court in Connecticut refused to grant
a "writ of assistance" to Duncan Stewart, agreeably to stat-
ute 14, Charles H. After the passage of a supplemental law,
7 George III., chap. 46, declaring that the aforesaid statute
applied to.the colonies, and supported by an opinion of Eng-
landis attorney general, De Grey, Stewart made a second ap-
plication; but the court again refused to grant the writ, upon
the ground that Acts of Parliament granting general writs
of assistance were unconstitutional.'
The General Assembly of Connecticut, before whom the
petition of Stewart was subsequently brought, declared that
it properly belonged for decision to the court, and it advised
the court to adhere to its position. The courts of other colo-
nies refused to grant general writs of assistance, especially in
Philadelphia, upon the ground that they were unconstitu-
tional; in fact but two of the colonies ever granted them:
Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
II. Under the Oonfederation, judicial questions of a national
character were determined by a court.
During the brief period of the Confederation, upon an appeal
to Congress by two or more States (that being the only case in
which it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal) this was the
law; in all disputes which may arise concerning boundary,
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever, the parties shall be
directed to appoint by joint consent a court, for hearing and
determining the matter in question: 9 Article. But if they dis-
agreed, what did Congress do ? Appoint a select number of its
1 We are well informed that the officers of the customs applied the last year
to the chief justice or bench of judges, In several of the Colonies, for granting
them writs of assistance, but that those justices, from a tender regard to the
Constitution and the rights of American freeholders, did actually refuse a
compliance with these demands: Boston E7vening Post, June 26,1769.
Chief Justice TaumBULL, of the Connecticut Court, said: "I have never yet
seen an Act of Parliament authorizing the Court of Exchequer in giving such
writs as they give, but conceive theyhave crept into use by the inattention of
the people, and the bad practices of designing men. We are directed to give
such writs as the Court of Exchequer is enabled by Act of Parliament to give
which are very different occasions of complaint from such writs as they do
give:" Quincy's Massachusetts Reports 504.
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own body to'try the case? No I Congress appointed a court'
composed of judges selected out of each of the United States I I
and from whose judgment in the case there could be no appeal!
it thus appearing that the modesty of our revolutionary states-
men, in their capacity as a Congress, would not allow them to
sit in judgment in any case where the validity of its acts
might be called into question.
III. The object sought by its framers in making the powers
of government under a constitution, separate and independent,
and in creatiny a judiciary co-ordinate with the other depart-
ments. YTe doctrine that the judiciary have the right of an
annulling power is shown by giving a history of the convention
which framed and rat ed the Constitution.
What is a constitution ? It is a written instrument, contain-
ing grants of limited power, and embodying those principles
which society accepts as its fundamental law. What is the
purpose of its creation? To secure the people from the oppres-
sion of their rulers.
A partial negative upon national legislation was contemplated
in the first draft of a constitution submitted to the national
convention by John Randolph, 5 Elliott's Deb. 126, the
rejection of an Act of Congress by the executive and judiciary
combined being final unless it were again passed by Congress
The statesman who offered it disclaimed any intention of giv-
ing indefinite powers to the legislature; whereupon their
enumeration and definition were favored in the first general
debate: By James Madison, 5 Elliott's Deb. 139.
At that stage in the prowedings of the convention only
one voice--Gunning Bedford, 5 Elliott's Deb. 153-had been
raised against the proposed check upon the legislature, but the
partial negative was agreed to, the executive alone was given
revisionary control of the laws, eight States voting in the
affirmative, and two States in the negative. The convention
ordained and established as a necessary department a judiciary,
which did not exist under the confederation: Federalist, Nos.
22, 28, 80, 81; 3 Elliott's Deb. 142, 143. The propriety
of the judiciary forming a part of the "Council of Revision,"
was doubted by Elbridge Gerry (5 Elliott's Deb. 151), it
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being maintained that it had sufficient check against encroach-
ment upon its own department, by its exposition of the laws,
which involved the power of decidingupon theirconstitutionality.
It was declared that the exercise of controling power by State
courts, over the laws enacted by State legislatures, had been
received with general approbation, the colonies already having
assumed the character of States. The judiciary was made
independent of the Congress, both in salary and tenure of office,
so that the latter could not become the virtual expositor as
well as maker of the laws by an undue complaisance on the
part of the judges. The organization of inferior-tribunals was
confided to the discretion of Congress, with the avowed object
of securing a fair and impartial trial by creating a judiciary
department cammensurate with the legislative authority: far-
tin v. Hunter, I Wheat. 328. The appointing power of the
judges, contrary to practice under the confederation, was taken
from the legislature and vested in the executive, in order to
make him responsible in selecting men for the judicial honors.
It was argued by James Madison (5 Elliott's Deb. 156) that
many of the members of Congress were not judges of the re-
quisite qualifications; that a good legislator (who might make a
very poor judge) would be the one whom they would be most
likely to elevate to the bench-ignoring even the supposition
that representatives in their recommendations to office could be
at all governed by intrigue, partiality or bribery.
In the subsequent powerful effort to induce the convention
to reconsider its vote, and to join the judiciary with the execu-
tive, as a revising power, so as to defend these co-ordinate de-
partments from legislative encroachment, to support the execu-
tive when right, and to control him when wrong, the logic of
the leading advocate of the council of revision James Madison,
(5 Elliott's Deb. 155) was without avail, and his measure
was lost. Undismayed, again he marshaled the friends of this
,favorite scheme; it was proclaimed that the American Consti-
tution was in greater danger from legislative usurpations
than from any other source-that the legislature would engulf
,As to his views upon the subject of annulling power, reference is made to
2 Elliott's Den. 390
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all the other powers within its vortex-but the original vote
(establishing these departments separate) was not overthrown.
Thus was secured the independence of the judiciary. In this
second forensic contest participated some of the leading states-
men of the convention; and history shows that those who ex-
pressed any opinion at that time-Col. Mason, 5 Elliott's Deb.
346, 347; Luther Martin, 3 Elliott's Deb. 44,45-were agreed
as regards the power of the judiciary to declare an Act of Con-
gress void for unconstitutionality; but, in a subsequent contro-
versy upon this subject [a council of revision], two members of
the convention-John Mercer and John Dickenson, 5 Elliott's
Deb. 429--disapproved of its annulling power-one giving
no reason and the other frankly confessing that he was at a
loss what expedient to substitute.
The introduction of the subject of jurisdiction of the national
tribunals did not lead to any discussion, and the proposition of
James Madison, 5 Elliott's Deb. 332, that it should extend to
all cases arising under the national laws, and to such other
questions as may involve the national peace and harmony, was
agreed to without one dissenting voice. When the present
second section of the third article of the Constitution was re-
ported in convention from the committee, it read: "The juris-
diction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising
under the laws passed by the legislature of the United States."
But it was amended, without any debate or dissent, to read as
follows: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity, arising under this Constitution the laws of the Uni-
ted States and treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority," it being generally understood that the jurisdiction
given was constructively limited to cases of a judicial nature.
After a session of more than four months here ended the
labors of the national convention. The Constitution was trans-
mitted to the States for adoption. Delaware, New Jersey, Geor-
gia and Vermont appear to have adopted it without debate.
In the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, Maryland,
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York and South Carolina
no person denied the doctrine of annulling power, and no im-
portant discussions appear to have occurred regarding the
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national jurisdiction. But this great right was distinctly as-
serted in the Massachusetts convention by John Adams, in Con-
necticut by Oliver Ellsworth, and though not in that of New
York by its premier, Alexander Hamilton, every reader of the
"Federalist" will rememler him to have held it forth therein
with unrivaled eloquence and the most convincing power. In
the Pennsylvania convention James Wilson was its champion,
and in the North Carolina convention Win. R. Davie, Richard
Spaight, and Judge James Iredell. There were several who
opposed the judiciary system, more or less, in all of the States,
but the doctrine of annulling power seemed to have been so
far conceded that discussion upon it was almost wholly omit-
ted And though some of their objections were tenable and
were instrumental in afecting amendments to the Constitution
yet, for anybody now in our day to maintain them he would
deserve to be reminded of a North Carolina delegate, Mr.
Bass (4 Elliott's Deb. 175), who said in his dissent to the ju-
diciary: "He reflected on no gentleman, but apologized for
his ignorance by observing that he never went to school and
had been born blind."
In the Virginia convention' the annulling power of the Ju-
diciary was maintained by Patrick Henry, James Madison,
John Marshall and Edmund Pendleton, the latter gentleman,
in enumerating the eleven subjects of jurisdiction as conferred
upon the national courts by the Constitution, distinctly as-
serting that it "extended to the laws of the Federal legisla,
ture:" 3d Elliott's Deb. 517.
To review the statement of history, who advocated the power
of the judiciary to annul an act of Congress for unconstituz
tionality ? Elbridge Gerry, Gouverneur Morris, James Madison,
Luther Martin, George Mason, James Wilson, Alexander Ham-
ilton, Oliver Ellsworth, John Adams, Wm. R. Davie, Richard
Spaight, James Iredell, Patrick Henry, John Marshall and Ed-
mund Pendleton. Judge Story says that Chas. Pickney too
affirmed this doctrine in debate in S. C. Cony. in 1778 (Story
1 Virginia was more largely represented in the constitutional convention tbae
any other State, and the three States of Virginia, New York and Pennsylvania.
exoeedcd in representation all the other States combined.
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Constn., sec. 390, note). Who denied this power? John Mercer,
John Dickinson and Gunning Bedford-fifteen men for it, three
against it, or just five to one in favor of this doctrine. It is un-
fortunate that the debates in Congress upon the law of Sept.
24, 1789, by which the judiciary was organized, were never
collected and published; we only know that it passed in the
Senate by a vote of 14 to 6, and in the House by a vote of
about 31 to 11, and that the names of the members of the
House who voted are not borne upon its journal. The 25th
section of that law should be regarded as a fair interpretation
of the meaning of the Constitution,contemporaneous with its
adoption, as it has been judicially decided to have gone into
operation the first Wednesday in March, 1789: Owings v.
.peed et al., 5 Wheat. 420. By this section the construction
of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute
of or commission held under the United States, has been ex-
pressly conceded to the final decision of the Supreme Court.
IV. This right can be vindicated independently of the jud-
ciary system of England by drawing comparisons between the
English and Amerian governments.
The security of popular rights depends in a great measure
upon an effective and independent judiciary, upon a tribunal
possessed of incorruptible integrity and a thorough knowledge
of the science of jurisprudence. The basis of the governments
of England and America are unlike; therefore the principles
which regulate its judiciary, will not apply to that of our
own country. In England, whence our ancestors came, under
whose government they lived here for more than a century,
and therefore were more strongly imbued with English ideas
than those of any other nation, it is the doctrine that the su-
preme power is vested in the Parliament; consequently it has
no written constitution. Whence the liberties of the Eng-
lish people, as declared by their Magna Charta? From the
Crown. Says the king: "We have given and granted to all
arch-bishops, bishops, abbots, prior&, earls, barons, and to all
the freemen of this our realm, these liberties'following to be
kept in our kingdom of England forever,"
The petition of rights to Charles I. concludes: "All of which
38
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they the people most humbly pray to be allowed as their
rights and liberties, according to the laws and statutes of this
our realm." 2 Elliott's Deb. 437; 1 Blackstone 233. Even
this fundamental law, if England can be said to have any,
may.be changed--even abolished at the pleasure of Parlia-
ment. Technically speaking, England has no written consti-
tution, and therefore the validity of Acts of Parliament is to
be understood in a far different sense than Acts of Congress
under a written constitution. The King of England can do
no wrong; the Parliament of England is omnipotent. But
in America there exists quite another doctrine. Here the
fountain of power is the people; they need no "bill of rights,"
for such would be an enumeration of the powers reserved.
Whatever their respect for the President, they yet deny his
moral infallibility, they honor their Congress, but they deny
its supremacy. Certain defined powers are indeed delegated
to the government, but the fee simple of power always remains
vested in the people; from them it derives all its powers.
The radical difference between the governmental system of
England and America is that of national sovereignty.
What is sovereignty? it is independence and supremacy:
Smith's Constitutional Law 119; it is the combination of all
power, the power to do everything in a State without ac-
countability: Story on the Constitution, see. 207. In our
mother country, it is vested in the Parliament; in this repub-
lic, it is vested in the people; there, the government masters
the people-here, the people master the government: 1 Wil-
son's Law Lectures 426. As its government is supreme, an
Act of Parliament can never be unconstitutional in the techni-
cal sense of that term: 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 428; 4 Black-
stone 435, 436; no court can defeat its intent when so plainly
expressed as to leave no doubt of what is that intention.
But the United States are governed by a constitution, or-
dained and established, not by the States in their sovereign
capacities, but by the people themselves: Hartin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 324;. M Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 ;
(o hens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Bhode Island v. Massa-
rhusetts, 12 Wheat. 657; 1st Kent's Commentaries 217; hence
594
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aa Act of Congress not in accordance with the Constitution is
uot law, and the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction will take cognizance of and decide upon that act
whenever its constitutionality judicially comes before it, the
court will decide which is the law-the Constitution adopted
by the people, or the legislative act adopted by their agents,
and if the legislative act conflicts with the fundamental law,
the court will declare it null and void: 1 Wilson's Law Lect.
461 Van orne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304; Taylor
v. Porter, 4 Hill, New York Rep. 146; Whittington v. Polk,
1 Harr. & Johns. 236.
In England representation is confined to the Commons-in
the United States it pervades every branch of the government ;
there, the House of Lords is vested with legislative and judi-
cial authority-here, the Senate is invested with legislative,
executive and judicial powers. But the Parliament cannot
infringe upon the fundamental principles of right and justice,
for they control all laws of whatever government, independently
of written constitutions: De Bonha's Case, 8 Reports 118;
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386 ; Day v. Savage, Hobart 85;
Rodgers v. Bradshaw, 20 J. R. 735.
No laws can enslave, destroy, or designedly impoverish a
subject (except for crimes whereof he has been tried, convicted
and sentenced by due process of law), for that would be to sub-
vert the great end of civil society, which is never for the ruin
of the people, but always for their safety and their common
happiness: Smith's Constitutional Law 128, 129, 131 ; Judge
STORY in Tilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters 654.
The English judges do not teach implicit obedience to a law
which leads to absurd or immoral consequences, or to an in-
fraction of the natural or divine law; neither do they proclaim
the law itself (which may be immoral, but cannot be illegal)
of no validity and null and void. The dictum of Lord Coke,
is: "- They hold it inapplicable, and declare that the particular
case is excepted out of the statute" : Sedgwick's Constitutional
Law, sec. 153.
This nation, unwilling in the least to part with her rights, or
to hold them in tail, has established limitations of power, as
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between her and her servants. If then an Act of Parliameit
against common right and reason, or impossible to be per-
formed, will be controlled and adjudged void by the common
law, a ferti i will be the Acts of Congress (even though not
against natural justice, be controlled and adjudged void by
the Constitution.
V. The distinction. between legislative and judicial poer;
the latter is circumscribed by se-imposed restrictions.
What is legislative power? The powerto makelaws: 1 Black-
stone 49. What is judicial power? The powerto make decrees
or determine private controversies: Sedgwick's Constitutional
Law 167; it is never exercised to give effect to the will of the
judge, but always to the will of the legislature, or the will of
the law: 1 Kent's Com. 277 ; but it must regard the Constitu-
tion as paramount: 1 Kent's Com. 448, 460.
In Vermont, an act granting an appeal beyond the time al-
lowed by law, is a decree rather than a law and void: Bates
v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77; State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152;
De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penna. 18.
An act of the State legislature declaring that a widow is
entitled to dower, is a judicial determination and void: Ed-
wards v. Pope, 3 Seam. 465.
A legislative act providing for payment of a claim, is in its
nature judicial: Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters 25.
A court cannot declare a law void because it conflicts with
the judge's opinion of policy, expediency or justice, for in such
an act it would exercise legislative power. It can only guard
the rights of the people when secured by a constitutional pro-
vision,wich comes for consideration judiciaUybeforeit. Courts
have often declined to interferewith legislative acts uncontrolled
by a constitution: Bennett v. Boggs, Baldwin 74, 75 ; -Eirby v.
Shaw, 7 Harris, Penn. Rep. 258; State v. Dawson, 3 Hill
100; James v. Patton, 2 Selden 9; and they have refued to
take up constitutional questions when not of full bench: Mayer
of N. Y. v. lr7es, 9 Peters 85; Briscoe, et al. v. Commonwpalth
Bank of Kentucky, 9 Peters 85. It always declined to exer-
cise annulling power, except in cases where the invalidity of
the law is clearly demonstrated: McCullough v. Maryland 4
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.Wheat. 316; Clrk v. People, 26 Wend. 599; The Sun Mutual
Insurance Co. v. City of N. Y, 5 Sanford 10; Lane et al. v.
Dorman et uxc. 3 Scam. 238; State v. Springfield Township,
6 Ind. 84; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 128; there must be no
doubt of the law being unconstitutional: Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 270; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N{. Y. 241.
It will not annul a law unless a decision upon that very
point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause:
Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 287.
If it can de6ide the case independently of the constitutional
question, it will do so: Frees v. Ford, 6 N. Y. 177 ; Mobile &
Ohio B. . v. State, 29 Ala. 573; White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56.
It will not decide such quqstions when the rights of the
parties are not involved: Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cowen, 543;
Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96; State v. Rich, 20 Miss.
393; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475.
If any part of a statute is good, the court will so far give it
effect: Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100; Fisher v. JH'Girr,
1 Gray 1; U. S. Bank v. Dudey's Lessee, 2 Peters 526.
The legislature's "motives" do not enter into the consider-
ation of the case by the court: People v. Draper, 15 N. Y.
555; Sunbury & Erie B. B. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penna. St. 278;
Baltimore v. State, 15 Maryland 376.
It ignores questions of a trivial nature: People v. Fisher,
24 Wendell 220.
As regards unwise and oppressive legislation within con-
stitutional bounds, courts refuse to interfere, claiming that
they can arrest the legislative will only when it conflicts with
a constitution; that the remedy in such cases is by an appeal
to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the
people, or if that fails, then to correct the evil in their sov-
ereign capacity: Bennett v. Boggs, Baldwin 74 ; Satterlee v.
Matthewson, 2 Peters 412.
These great departments of government are responsible to
the people for their acts. The people constituted a judiciary
to judge of the laws; the legislature, therefore, cannot assume
judicial functions, and under no circumstances can it shift its
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duty upon the people in order to escape responsibility: Barkeir
v. Commonwealth, 6 Barr 507; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165.
This right to expound the Constitution and thelaws has been
exclusively confided to the judges from the earliest period of
our history: 2 Story on Const., sec. 18412; 1 Kent's Com. 451;
Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barbour, N. Y., 112. And in England
it has been claimed for them by some of those jurists who
have erected her system of jurisprudence and'adorned it with
their learning.
Notwithstanding these self-imposed limitations, it has found
ample scope for the exercise of annulling power. The first
Act of Congress which came before the Supreme Court was the
one entitled: "To provide for the settlement of the claims of
widows and orphans, barred by the limitations heretofore
established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensioners,"
passed March 23,1792. It was considered the following 5th
of April, Chief Justice JAY presiding, and the court unani-
mously determined that the duties assigned by that law to the
Circuit Courts were not of a judicial nature, inasmuch as their
decisions were subject, first, to consideration and suspension
by the Secretary of War, and then to revision by the legisla-
ture; whereas by the Constitution no executive officer or leg-
islaiure is authorized to revise the acts or opinions by the Su-
preme Courts. The judges received this law with the most
profound respect, but they declared it to be their painful duty
to object thereto, although it was founded on the purest prin-
ciples of humanity and justice: IREDELL, in Hayburn v. U.
S., 2 Dallas 409, note.
In the August term of the Supreme Court, 1792, the case of
Win. Hayburn was considered, who applied to be placed on the
U. S. pension list, agreeably to the law of March 23, 1792,
which the judges had already declared unconstitutional. This
case was argued before the court by Attorney General Ran-
dolph, but it modestly declined to pass judgment, saying tat
ii would hold the question under advisement, viz. : the motion
for mandamus to the Circuit Court for Pennsylvania to proceed
under the act): Hayburn, petitioner, 2 Dallas, 410, note.
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- Hayburn presented a memorial to Congress, praying relief,
April 13, 1792, and it being recognized that this was the first
case in which a legislative act had been declared void by a court
of justice, a committee of fve was appointed to inquire into
the facts and report thereon; five days afterward the mem-
orial was laid on the table without debate: Annals of Second
Congress 559. This law was repealed February 28, 1793, and
the question of constitutionality was not raised either in the
Senate or the House, regarding the act repealed.
The next case wherein the question of constitutionality
was raised before the Supreme Court, was- under the act of
Congress June 5, 1794, known as the carriage-tax law, which
was decided in the February term, 1796, Chief Justice ELLS-
woRTA, presiding. This law was declared constitutional: Hil-
ton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171. But in the annual state-
ment of receipts and expenditures of the government, 1796,
it is seen that Congress paid $960.66 as counsel fees to Ham-
ilton of New York, Campbell of Virginia, and Attorney Gen-
eral Ingersoll of Pennsylvania.
The constitutionality of a revenue law was thus submitted to
the decision of the Supreme Court with full knowledge and
sanction of Congress, which paid the counsel who defended
the validity of the act before the highest tribunal in the land.
Annals of Seventh Congress 926.
The next case was the celebrated one of Morbery v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 127, decided in February term, 1803, Chief Jus-
tice JoHN MA.sHALL presiding. It arose under the Judiciary
Act of 1789. The Constitution conferred upon the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction only i'n two cases; therefore for the
court to issuea writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of
State to deliver a paper would be an exercise of original juris.
diction, not conferrable by Congress, and not conferred by the
Constitution. So much then of the 13th section of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 as attempted to grant such power was de-
clared inoperative. Interest is enlivened in the perusal of these
historical incidents, by the fact that each one of these three
Acts of Congress which came before the court between the
years 1792 and 1803 were decided by different Chief Justices,
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JAY, ELmSWORTa and MARSHALL. 'In a speech made iii the
United States Senate in April, 1830, it was said that the Su,
pieme Court had declared unconstitutional two Acts of Con.
gress, twenty-six acts of State legislatures, annulled fourteen
judgments of State courts, had rendered two opinions against
the President, and two also against the Secretary of State;
Johnson, 4 Elliott's Deb. 523. "Behold the bleached skele-
tons of laws which have died of the judiciary " I
VI. The interpretation given by the ex ousnder of the Constitu-
lion of that part of -it which confers the national jurisdiction.
But it has been contended on the part of Congress that it is
a solecism to invest one body of men with authority to make
lMws, and at the same time to empower another body of men
with authority to annul them; that such judicial power was
unknown to this country as to national legislation, when the
Constitution was framed in 1787, and that this claim is but a
dogma of the Supreme Court: Speech of Drake, U. S. Senate,
Dec. 13, 1869. In a government where the power emanates
from the people, and is lodged by them in separate, co-ordinate
and independent departments whose rights are not inherent, but
consist only of grants contained in a written Constitution,wherc
a judieial department is created uniformly to interpret, pro-
nounce and execute the law, to decide coLtroversies, and to en
force rights so that the government shall not perish by its owL
imbecility, or else compel the other departments to usurp powers
so as to command obedience and maintain liberty, this asser-
tion cannot stand: 2 Story on Constitution, sees. 1574, 1576.
The American courts exercised this prerogative before we had
a Constitution. However strongly it may be contended that
they had no right to do so, nevertheless they did, and with a
single exception (in Rhode Island) the people sustained them.
Long and well established precedents make law: Stuart v. Laird,
1803, 1 Cranch 309; else, why did not Congress impeach the
Supreme Court judges in 1792, as did the Rhode Island Legisla-
ture its judges in 1786. No action disclosed in the proceed
1 For a comprehensive review of an exercise of annulling power by th4
judiciary, in the early history of Ihe United States Government, reference ta
made to note G, Orations of 'rimke, Charleston, 1827, page 106.
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rngs of the constitutional conventions national or State, show
the most distant intent to change the then universally accepted
practice of the courts,wherever they have discharged this high
prerogative. No action reveals their belief that Congress
could strip the judiciary of any of its jurisdiction. On the con-
trary the national Constitution was modeled after the consti-
tutions of nine of the thirteen original States, viz.: New Hamp.
shires Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, which
already had committed the general power in the last resort to
distinct and independent bodies of men. No fair interpreta-
tion of the people's command would be given,' if the power
to judge law were not co-extensive with the power to make
law, especially when that interpretation of the Constitution has
been given by some of the framers themselves of that high
commission: Edmund Pendleton, 3 Elliott's Debates 517. Al-
though there is nothing in the Constitution which inhibits the
legislature from revising a judicial decision,such an act would
be improper upon the general principles of law and reason:
Denny v. .Afaltoon, 2 Allen 361; whereas the revision of leg-
islative acts by a judiciary, circumscribed by precedents and
self-imposed limitations, and knowing its acts will exist for
the guidance of succeeding generations, is productive of the
happiest results. It is the scale in the gold mint which detects
the spurious money by a uniform standard. The judiciary can-
not encroach to any sensible degree upon the legislature, by
reason of this comparative weakness; for -without purse or
sword, sustained only by the force of reason, the judges knew
that they would be immediately impeached and degraded from
office for any betrayal of their high trust: Federalist No. 81
The words "with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the'Congress shall make," in-fairness, should be construed
now as they were in 1787. In vain will any one search history
for other construction of them than this: that Congress could
1 "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court,"-" the Judicial
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitu-
tion"--- this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land."
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regulate only the appellate jurisdiction offacts as well as law,
not the clas.es of cases which constitute. the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. There were, in 1787, four kinds of courts in
our country: common law, probate, admiralty and chancery.
New York, Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina had estab-
lished all these courts; New Jersey had courts of common law
and chancery; Pennsylvania,Delaware and North Carolina had
courts of common law and admiralty; Rhode Island, Massachu-
setts and N. Hampshire had courts of common law and probate,
while Georgia had only a court of common law: Federalist No.
83. Nojury trial was had except at common law; so it is at once
seen what a diversity in practice the States pursued as to this
mode of trial. Therefore, in the creation of national courts, the
convention left this subject of law andfact, and the two modes
of trial which should apply thereto, according to the exigencies
of the case, to the regulations and exceptions of Congress, .be-
cause it could not be conveniently regulated in the Constitution
without dissatisfaction to the several States, each of which
would be partial to its own practice. If the convention had not
left this subject to the legislation of Congress, then the Consti-
tution would have to be amended by the people every time
any change should be necessary. For this reason Congress
may provide that in some cases the Supreme Court shall revise
only matters of law, while in other cases its jurisdiction shall
extend to re-examination offacts as well as law; but Congress
is not empowered with authority to take away the case alto-
gether. To this construction Congress has given its most sol-
emn sanction. The legislative power shall be vested in a Con-
gress; the judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court
(and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish). These two phrases are analogous
in meaning. If, then, the people commanded that the legisla-
tive power should be, and that it was vested at once in a Con-
gress, the same reasoning applies to the judicial power, be-
cause if Congress were given any discretion it could rescind
that power; but if the Constitution vested it, then only the
people themselves could divest it in any degree. This was a
mandatory order of the people to their representatives to -or-
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ganize the Supreme Court; when Congress executed that or-
der the court was immediately and absolutely clothed with
all the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, precisely as
the legislative power was vested in the Congress: Mfartin v.
Hunter, 1 Whea . 304. Could Congress withhold or abridge
the tenure of office (though it did so in 1802), or the compen-
sation of the judges? Certainly not agreeably to the under-
standing of the men who made the Constitution. Then could
Congress, at its discretion, withhold any part of that jurisdic-
tion ? If so, Congress might have refused to give it effect,
and thus have defeated the will of the people.
When once vested, any restrictions or regulations, or any
internal arrangements devolved upon Congress, but nothing
more. In the great case of Chisholm v. Georgia, decided in
the Supreme Court, in February, 1793,1 2 Dallas 419, 475,
where theright was confirmed that a citizen could sue the State,
why did not Congress pass a law divesting the Supreme Court
of appellate jurisdiction in such cases, if it were subject to
any control of Congress? No such law was passed. Congress
submitted this matter (of retraction of the national jurisdic-
tion) to the _people who adopted the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution, one year after the rendering of that decision.
Here, the Congress most solemnly admitted that it could
not strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction.
VII. The reasons for investing the judiciary with power to
annul an Act of Congress for unconstitutionality.
The judiciary ought to be the final interpreter in constitu-
tional and all judiciary controversies. Even Thomas Jefferson,
the greatest man in this country who ever opposed the an-
nulling power of the judiciary, advised the President, in 1793,
to defer to the judges of the United States Supreme Court
for a construction of our treaties, the laws of nature and na-
tions, and the laws of the land: 4 Jefferson's Writings 22. He
did not avow his antipathy to the judiciary until after he had
retired from the presidency; and its earliest disclosure as
taken from his own writings, was in a private letter dated
,Tune 11, 1815: 6 Jefferson's Writings 462. See Jefferson's
1 Massachusetts too, was sued in the year 1796: Appendix to 9 Dane's Abridg-
ment, see. 6. p. 16.
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notes on Virginia, in the Federalist, No. 48. The doctrine of
the "annulling power of the judiciary" was first denied in
Congress by Senator Breckinridge, of Kentucky, in 1802: An.
nals 7 Cong., p. 179. With a few exceptions, since the for-
mation of our government, the States of this Union have cheer-
fully acquiesced in the decisions of the national judiciary,
realizing that a peaceful submission to its benign authority is
far better than to trust to their own decisions, which would
institute a hydra of government from which nothing could
proceed but confusion and bloodshed.' J. H. M.
I In 1810 Pennsylvania resisted an execution of process of the IT. S. Court by
force of arms. Her legislature proposed an amendment to the Constitution to
avoid future difficulty, but no State recognized the proposition: 6 Hildreth's
Hist. U.S.155 a.165. Pennsylvania resisted an Excise law of the UnitedStates
In 1794, vi et armi: 4 Hildreth, 49.
The Virginia Judiciary refused to obey the order of the Supreme Court in the
case of Martin v. runter, 1 Wheat. 304. Georgia refused, also, in the case of
Worcester v. &ate qf Georgia, 6 Peters 515, and Buter v. Id., 6 Peters 597. Her
legislature, also refused to comply with the order of the Supreme Court allow-
Ing a writ of error to the State court in the case of " Tassels" in 1830, and
"Graves," in 1834, both of whom were executed. Also, in this connection, the
case of .bzdelford, Iby & Co. v. City of Savannah2, 14 Georgia 40, may be cited.
Also, opinion of Mr. Justice BAUTIar, of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 1855, in the
ease of Munt v. Ma tearboat Ohio, 4 Am. Law Reg. 49, in which final arbitra-
tion is denied to U. S. Supreme Court. But seethe answers of the State legisla-
tures to the Virginia resolutions; of Rhode Island, February, 1799; Wew Hamp-
shire, June, 1799: and Vermont, October, 1799: 4 Elliott's Deb. 33, 338, 539, in
which they acknowledged the Supreme Court to be the Anal arbiter. So, too
decided Mass., Februar,, 1799.
The decisions of the judiciary have never been disturbed by Congress: 1
Lloyd's Deb.219, 596; 2 Lloyd's Deb, 284,327. Chief Justice cKvAw (of Penna.)
decided that the Supreme Court was not the final arbiter in the case of Corn-
monweath v. CbbOet, 3 Dall 393; but a contrary opinion was given by Chief
Justice Srx cEa (of N.Y. ), in case of Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 J. R. 164.
Although Virginia and Kentucky, in 1798 and 1800, denied this power to the
Supreme Court, yet when Pennsylvania revolted in 1810, Virginia unanimously
decided the other way, and the States of Kentucky, New Hampshire, Vermont,
North Carolina, Maryland, Georgia, Tennessee and New Jersey, uuncurred:
North American Review, October, 1830, p. 507 a. 512. And Pennsylvania decided
that the Supreme Court was final arbiter in all disputesin March, 1831:1 Story,
Const. see. 391, note. Also, the following decisions may be given here: .MAaran
v. Hlunter, 1 Wheat. 301 a. 334; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Bank of Hans.
iaon v. Dudley, 2 Peters R. 524; and Ware v. Mlton, 3 Dall. 199.
